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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 A STUDY ON CHINA’S UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT  
IN RELATION TO THE NATIONALISM OF ETHNIC MINORITIES 
By 
 
Jungwon Yang 
 
 
China has been the most rapidly growing economy in the world for over 
25 years. This growth has fueled a remarkable increase in per capita 
income and a sharp decline in poverty rate. At the same time, however, 
different kinds of disparities have increased. Inequality has risen, 
propelled by rural-urban gap and regional gap.  
In other aspects, there have been ethnic minority movements for entire 
sovereignty or separatism in China. At first, it started from repulsion of 
the oppressed process of unification by the Chinese Communist Party, 
but as time passes by, the aspect of the nationalism has been changed. 
At the level of pre-industrialization, nation difference or inequality was 
not severe enough to regard them as suppressed class nation or 
“periphery”. However, after declaring Chinese way of Capitalism and 
adopting an opening-door policy, the gap amongst regions has sharply 
increased. Minorities become a nation class. Hechter argued that it is 
“Internal Colonialism”. According to his logic, minorities as periphery 
have difficulty in getting over inequality situation and escaping from 
poverty because their human and natural resources are used for the 
development of core.  
  
Based on this hypothesis, this study assumes whether Chinese unequal 
development affects the rising of minority nationalism, and tries to 
reveal its relation. If inequality influences the occurrence of minority 
nationalism, conflict regions will suffer much more from unequal 
development. If they have similar conditions to other autonomous 
minority regions, another factor should be considered. Therefore, in 
this study, the research objects will be categorized into four groups 
(five leading regions, non-autonomous regions, autonomous regions 
and conflict regions) and compare data which can estimate the degree 
of economic and social development. From the analysis of each data’s 
result, we could prove the relation between unequal development and 
minority nationalism. 
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 1  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background 
“Nation is an imagined political community.” argues Benedict Anderson. 
He indicates that it is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion.1  In fact, a nation seems to be quite a vague and 
rather subjective community. However, in spite of the ambiguity of its 
substance, this imagined community is stronger than any other political 
or religious community and has a certain destructive power which is 
expressed as nationalism. Regardless of the actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail in the nation, the nation itself is always 
conceived as being founded upon a deep and horizontal comradeship. 
Ultimately, it is this fraternity that over the past two centuries made it 
possible for many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to 
die for such limited imaginings.2 Owing to this reason, at the national 
level, governments sometimes try to use it as an effective method of 
suppressing social conflicts and justify its own system. Only giving 
impression that a government advocates the right of the nation can 
have power over its people. However, this kind of propaganda is not 
always valid in every country. If a country has more than one nation 
                                            
1
 Benedict Anderson, “Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism”, Revised Edition ed. London and New York: Verso, 1991, p.5 
2
 Benedict Anderson, same book, p.7 
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within it, the government should focus on the majority nation and 
conflicts; otherwise, dissatisfactions of other minority nations could not 
be escaped. As a matter of fact, countries that are only comprised of a 
single nation are rare in the world and therefore, there has been a 
significant increase of ethnic or nation conflicts in the last decade. 
They constitute one of the main sources of domestic political instability 
in multi-national countries. China, the most typical example of a multi-
national country, has not been exempt from this trend, as demonstrated 
by ethnic conflicts in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.3  
The problem surrounding Chinese minority nationalism has been 
focused on by many scholars. However, Chinese government officially 
denied the existence of ethnic conflicts and this made it difficult to do 
precise research on it. Studies on Chinese ethnics minorities were 
mostly triggered by the issue of Tibet; but until 1990s even studies 
with a limited scope were not performed well; and moreover, until the 
1980s the dominant perspective even among western scholars was that 
China was a unitary country, and interest for Chinese minorities or 
China as a multi-ethnic state did not exist at all. There were only 
limited conversations about nationalism as a major ideology of Chinese 
Communism, but not about minority nationalism. After China opened its 
doors to the western world in the 1980s, a new generation of scholars 
of Chinese studies started to show interest in minority problems. 
However, their work was limited to regions where the Chinese 
government could control sources and data, or regions where the 
                                            
3
 Thomas Heberer, China’s nationalities policies: Quo Vadis?, Institute of East Asian 
Studies, University Duisburg-Essen, Germany. p.1 
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minority group had a positive attitude toward the central government.4 
Furthermore, the diversity of religions, languages and social 
development of each minority region prevented the scholars from doing 
more precise research. These factors caused the research to stay at a 
basic level.  
Despite restrictions and difficulties, some scholars like Harrell, 
Heberer and Hechter have studied the subjects of political autonomy, 
economic policy and identification of minorities and endeavored to 
reveal that these factors related with minority nationalism. 
Harrell insisted that the source of minority conflicts was from the 
collective memory of historical knowledge, especially from Sino-
centered images. He set forth that the Cultural Revolution was not only 
directed at psychological and physical annihilation and suppression, but 
comprised an element of “memoricide”, that is, the extermination of 
historical documents, accompanied by rituals of intimidation, with the 
goal of demonstrating who had the monopoly of interpreting Chinese 
history. This memoricide had not been forgotten, especially today, 
where representatives of various minorities are trying to reappraise the 
interpretation of their history. Concurrently, among ethnic minorities in 
China we can see the rediscovery of their history and an increasing 
consciousness thereof. Accordingly, Steven Harrell argued that a triple 
pattern of ethnic classification exists in China: ethno-history, a 
scholarly discourse of the history of a nationality or an area; state 
                                            
4
 Colin Mackerras, “China’s Minority; Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth 
Century”, Oxford Univ. Press, 1995, p.15 Quoted in Lee, Jinyoung, “Study on the 
theoretical base of Chinese minorities policy”, Asia-Pacific study, Kyunghee Univ. 
Asia-Pacific research center, Dec. 1999, p.279 
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discourse of ethnic historization, the official classification by Chinese 
authorities; and ethnic identity, the perception of one’s own ethnic 
identity.5 The conflicts among them make ethnic minorities realize their 
distorted and suppressed history, provoking nationalism. Undoubtedly, 
there are differences in the ways in which each nationality evaluates its 
history and historical events, so the aspect of nationalism is different 
from nation to nation. And there is also a constraint of this perspective 
that it is not sufficiently understood by the political leadership of the 
Han people, the majority ethnic group of China.6  
Taking a different point of view, Herberer emphasized that political 
source was the main reason causing minority conflicts. He insisted that 
the year 1982’s constitution re-evaluated minorities and the year 
1984’s “Autonomy Law” formally extended to them the widest-
reaching freedoms since the founding of the People’s Republic.7 But 
most of the clauses of the Autonomous Law were so vaguely worded 
that they are not complementary in the absence of accompanying laws. 
It is a soft law that sets goals that should be followed as much as 
possible by state policies. It lacks reference to an effective system for 
the protection of autonomy. In addition, there are no legal measures for 
the implementation of this law. Therefore, Herberer points out that 
there are correspondingly many complaints that local authorities do not 
                                            
5
 Harrell, Steven, “The History of the History of the Yi, in: Harrell, S., ed, Cultural 
Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers”, Seattle and London; University of 
Washington Press, 1995, p.98 
6
 Thomas Heberer, “China’s nationalities policies: Quo Vadis?”, Institute of East Asian 
Studies, University Duisburg-Essen, Germany. p.5 
7
 Heberer, Thomas, “Gesetz uber die Gebietsautonomie der Nationalitaten der VR 
China”, Ubersetzung and Kommentar, in: China aktuell, October, 1984, pp 601-604. 
Quoted in Thomas Heberer, “China’s nationalities policies: Quo Vadis?”, Institute of 
East Asian Studies, University Duisburg-Essen, Germany. p.8 
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keep to it.8 However, this perspective also has the limit that it does not 
explain why there are some minorities or regions that have stronger 
nationalism whereas there are others who do not, in spite of similar 
level of adjustment of autonomous law to all minorities. Rather, the 
Chinese government tends to give more priority or advantage of 
political autonomy right to conflict regions to alleviate the tension. 
However, the result seems prone to backfire despite its intentions. 
There are also some scholars 9  who emphasize the importance of 
revitalization of religions. They insist that the increasing consciousness 
of national identity, especially among the larger peoples, expresses 
itself, among other ways, in increasing religiousness. The growing 
influence of religion and traditional culture among ethnic minorities has 
to be understood as an indication of rising ethnicity. In this context, 
religions and traditions are not only a reminder of one’s own culture 
and cultural identity, but also serve to get to grips with a social change. 
The increasing influence of religions and traditions are thus also a 
reaction to the process of social changes. Some scholars go as far as to 
say that the process of modernization and transformation weakens the 
cohesion of an ethnic group and produces mobilization to preserve the 
group identity in religion and in that way promotes ethnic nationalism.10 
However, this perspective bears the danger of neglecting other 
possibly influential factors and blaming a specific religious group or 
                                            
8
 Wang Geliu 1997; He Gaowa 1997; Ma Wenyu 1997; Wu Zongjin 1998, pp. 167ff; 
Hao 1998, pp241;Shen/Shi 1998, pp136;Wang Yongwu 1998. Quoted in Thomas 
Heberer, “China’s nationalities policies: Quo Vadis?”, Institute of East Asian Studies, 
University Duisburg-Essen, Germany. p.8 
9
 Shen Jun (1997), Bajie Rihuo(1998), Zhou/Xia(1995), etc. 
10
 Thomas Heberer, “China’s nationalities policies: Quo Vadis?”, Institute of East 
Asian Studies, University Duisburg-Essen, Germany. p.14  
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community for all conflicts. Rather than being at the root of nationalism, 
the revitalization of religion overwhelmingly seems to be a comfort 
mechanism to forget about the harsh reality.  
Finally, there exists a perspective that argues that unequal 
development is the causal factor of minority nationalism. Actually, the 
process of economic development increasingly generates inequalities 
within nations. While rural-urban and regional inequalities continue to 
widen in many countries, internal divisions along ethnic lines are 
understood worse. However, historically and in the present, ethnic 
inequalities have grown alongside regional inequalities in many nations. 
11 On this point, Hechter used the concept of “Internal Colonialism.” 
The internal colonialism model argues that the process of national 
development leads to divergence in economic integration as well as 
cultural and political integration among different ethnic groups located 
within a single nation. Hechter states that “the internal colonialism 
model posits altogether different consequences resulting from 
heightened core-periphery interaction. Structural inequalities between 
the regions should increase, as the periphery develops in a dependent 
mode. Individuals of the core culture are expected to monopolize the 
high prestige roles in the social structure of the peripheral regions, as 
is the situation in overseas colonies. The bulk of the peripheral 
population is confined to subordinate positions in the social structure. 
In sum, a cultural division of labor arises.” (Hechter, 344)12 This model 
                                            
11
 Christopher Sullivan, “Inequality in Reform era China: The Ethnic question”, Paper 
prepared for the population association of America’s annual conference, session on 
Chinese inequality, April 2006, Los Angeles, CA, p.1 
12
 Hechter, Michael, “Internal Colonialism”, London; Routledge & Paul, 1975. Quoted 
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does not fully indicate that internal colonialism is closely connected to 
the occurrence of minority nationalism like other theories. It tends to 
focus on the causal factor of regional inequality rather than ethnic 
nationalism. However, it is meaningful in that it reveals that regional 
inequality is not simply a product of a policy failure, but is also 
influenced by the unequal treatment between the core and periphery 
alongside ethnic differences. If we consider the Han people as the core 
and the other minorities as the periphery in China, we are able to adopt 
a different perspective on serious development problems involving 
regional inequalities, free from the idea that this results from the 
inevitable policy of “Choice and Concentration”, the view of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Additionally, assuming that poor 
periphery regions have been treated unequally, we can deduce that a 
seriously deteriorated region would have strong complaints and a high 
level of dissatisfaction about the core. This can lead to the occurrence 
of nationalism. 
Ernest Geller also points out that the fervent level of nationalism 
happens at the point of industrializing and when the gap between the 
ones who possess authority or power of politics, economy and 
education and the others who do not is at its widest.13 In a community 
of nation under a stable agricultural system, features characteristic of 
nationalism are inexistent. Even if a class was suppressed or exploited 
by another class, they would not subvert the political system until they 
                                                                                                                             
in Christopher Sullivan, “Inequality in Reform era China: The Ethnic question”, Paper 
prepared for the population association of America’s annual conference, session on 
Chinese inequality, April 2006, Los Angeles, CA, p.1 
13
 Ernest Gellner ,”Nation and nationalism”, Yeha Publisher, 1988, p.155 
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classified themselves as a separate nation or race. Only when a certain 
nation becomes a suppressed class and recognizes that its community 
is treated unequally, does a nation take actions with political intentions. 
Only a national class or class nation can become a political catalyst.14 If 
industrialization gives a great wealth to a group of people but does not 
reduce the economic gap between national classes, emotions of 
nationalism may be provoked. Only when the ruling class and ruled 
class are categorized according to national differences, can the emotion 
of nationalism be wounded seriously. In this point, there is a high 
possibility that the area where minority races reside in a severely 
deteriorated surrounding can be the highly potential place of origin 
causing minority nationalism. This logic is quite similar to “Internal 
Colonialism” mentioned above.  
Following this logic, not only isolated conflict regions such as Tibet, 
Inner Mongolia, and Xingjian, but also other regions could become 
hotbeds for conflicts in the near future as they recognize that they are 
exploited by the Han people and do not share the fruits of economic 
growth despite providing abundant natural resources in their areas. In 
the past, they were connected under the banner of Socialism and the 
gap among them was not so big. But now they do not have any title or 
justification that can tie them up with each other. Actually, riots and 
demonstrations in autonomous areas of ethnic minorities have already 
occurred. They asked for independence or full autonomy while 
displaying anger at the difference in economic growth between the 
                                            
14
 Ernest Gellner ,”Nation and nationalism”, Yeha Publisher, 1988, p. 165 
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areas of Han people and theirs.15 Although the Chinese government 
tries to combine together all nations under the name of “the Great 
Nation of China”, the questions of whether this concept can work 
effectively linger on. Once the open economy of China boosts regional 
inequality even more and the ethnic minorities’ respect and expectation 
towards China’s Communism fade away due to the realization that they 
remain at the periphery, what will happen?  
For studies focusing on causal factors of minority nationalism in 
different historical aspects, the lack of political autonomy or religious 
reason are also valuable lines of explanation. However, these factors 
could be regarded as results caused by the economic inequality 
because they can occur in the process of adjusting unequal economic 
policy or a reaction to it. Therefore, in this study, I will focus more on 
economic factors16 (unequal development by regions and within region) 
to explain the cause of minority nationalism and reveal that the depth of 
economic plight in conflict regions at the periphery is stronger than in 
other more peaceful regions, which in turn provokes strong 
nationalistic emotions.  
 
                                            
15
 For example, in February of 1995, in Inner Mongolia, a group of executives having 
hundreds of Mongolian Protestants were arrested in the name of criminal offense of 
subversion and disunion of a country and agitation for anti-revolution. In Xinjiang 
Uygur, from the middle of April of 1996 to May 20
th
 there were 45 riots gathering 
65,000 people at fifteen places. They joined ‘East Turkistan national revolution group’ 
of Kazakhstan and demanded the foundation of independent country. And for six days 
from February 5
th
 of 1997, in Xinjiang, a demonstration of the largest scale ever to 
have taken place in China since the founding of the country took place. (Chinese 
study, 82 series, Seoul, Hanyang Univ. The research center of Asia-Pacific 
regions,1999) 
16
 It does not simply mean purely economic factors. It belongs to the social unequal 
development as well as the economic inequality. 
 10  
2. Contents and Purpose of Study 
The contents of this study can be divided into three parts.  
Firstly, by way of looking into the present condition and situation of 
Chinese ethnic minorities, their symbolic and realistic status will be 
discussed. Thus light can be shed on why Chinese communism puts a 
lot of emphasis on the policy of autonomous areas in spite of their 
numeric inferiority. Later on, the focus will move to the overall 
situation of three conflict regions such as Tibet, Inner Mongolia and 
Xingjian and the origin of the most severe nationalism will be discussed. 
Still now, these regions account for the bulk of separatist movements in 
China and demands for full autonomy are still raised. To suppress these 
demands, China’s communist government has used both carrot and 
stick policies; and by encouraging the immigration of Han people, the 
government has tried to decrease the ratio of ethnic minorities within 
these areas. 17 Some of these policies proved to be effective, but most 
of them were ineffective. There will be a need to find out why special 
ethnic minorities’ nationalism or separatist movements are so strong 
and do not disappear. To know the cause, two broad perspectives will 
be shortly mentioned; one is a perspective that looks at the non-
economic factors such as differences of historical culture, political 
autonomy and religion as decisive factors. The other perspective looks 
more closely at economic and social development factors as possible 
causes. The former is the more dominant theory among Chinese 
scholars, but I will focus more on the latter.   
                                            
17
 In the policy of Han immigration, it causes more discontents because minorities 
start to realize that even the small fruit of regional development can be deprived by 
Han people. 
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Secondly, the unequal development situation in China will be discussed. 
As I mentioned before, this study focuses on the relationship of ethnic 
minorities’ nationalism with inequality. First of all, by dividing all 31 
regions into four categories - leading five regions, non-autonomous 
regions (with an overwhelmingly Han population), autonomous regions 
(ethnic minorities) and conflict three regions (Tibet, Inner Mongolia and 
Xingjian), the different degrees of development will be considered. Six 
indicators for measuring inequality will be used; the difference of 
economic structure and GDP, unemployment rates and total wage, 
educational degree, urban and rural development, infrastructure and 
social welfare system among regions will be discussed. Secondly, the 
situation of inequality or discrimination within conflict regions between 
Han Chinese and ethnic minorities is discussed. With difficulties in 
collecting data, this part relies on literature references. It certainly has 
the limit to show clear-cut image, however, as a complement of data 
outcomes, it will helpful to understand the concept of core-periphery 
relations or internal colonization occurring in the same region.      
Thirdly, based on second part, I will analyze the data and lead to the 
result of correlation of inequality development and minority nationalism. 
If all the three conflict regions have conditions similar to other 
autonomous regions, the other factors should be emphasized and the 
basic assumption of this study should be revised. If not, we can reach 
the conclusion that unequal development is a strong causal factor of 
minority nationalism in China,  
 
Based on this, this study has clear purposes.  
 12  
Firstly, it is to detect strong causal factors of the problems of minority 
nationalism. By comparing the region’s unequal situation, I will show 
that conflict regions are in a much worse economic state than other 
regions, especially even than other autonomous regions. From the 
result, I will reveal that this unequal treatment in development leads to 
high dissatisfaction of people in those regions, which in turn may 
encourage conflicts and minority ethnic nationalism. 
Secondly, it is to encounter a solution to the problem of ethnic 
minorities’ nationalism. Facing the 17th National People's Congress 
Standing Committee (NPCSC), Chinese communists will decide the 
policy for the next four years and three ways are rumored to be 
discussed. Broadly speaking, left wing people will insist that only a 
more tightly planned economy can save China from its current 
problems and solve the minority nationalism while right wing people 
are insisting on the necessity of democratization. And the rest is 
arguing in favor of a vague middle way between them. Will these 
conversations really benefit ethnic minorities and the future of China? 
What will be the real solution or policy of minority nationalism 
problem? This study will take these considerations into account.  
 
3. Methodology of Study 
(1)Literature References 
Firstly, were reviewed white books, master’s and doctoral theses, 
articles in periodicals, research papers regarding nationalism, China, 
Chinese nationalism, ethnic minorities, autonomous areas of China, 
Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xingjian.  
 13  
Secondly, were also reviewed working papers from websites of the 
World bank, Columbia international affairs online(CIAO), Human right 
watch and articles of newspapers from people daily 
(www.peopledaily.com.cn), China Youth Daily(www.bjyouth.com.cn), 
Agence France-Presse(www.afp.com), Xinhua(www.xinhua.org), Dong-
AIlbo(www.donga.com),HankyorehIlbo(www.hani.co.kr),Guardian(www.
guardian.co.uk) and Independent(www.independent.co.uk), Wall Street 
Journal(www.wallsteetjournal.com) and official homepage of Tibetan 
government in exile(www.tibet.com). 
 
(2) Analysis on Data of National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) 
The raw data from 1996 to 2005 from the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China were downloaded from their webpage 18  to be analyzed. 
Microsoft Excel was used as a statistical tool for arranging data and 
statistical analysis. 
 
4. Scope of Study 
The time scope of this study ranges mainly from 1996 to 2005.19 As a 
matter of fact, to obtain more exact result, it would be more suitable to 
set the time scope from the time that Deng Xiaoping started an open 
economy policy in 1978 up to now. During that time, however, there 
have been some changes in administration districts and that makes it 
more difficult to access each region’s data. Almost all data in this study 
are from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC); so, I set the 
                                            
18
 www.stats.gov.cn  
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time scope as wide as I could, according to the availability of securing 
raw data. As the last decade is the period that China has experienced a 
rapid growth rate and development while at the same time the Chinese 
government policy for the autonomous areas should show results, it will 
be meaningful to study this time scope. 
 
The objects of this study are 31 regions of China. It is based on the 
distraction division from the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(NBSC). I will divide them into four groups: the first is the group of five 
leading cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Gwangdong and Chongqing; 
second come eight regions (Shanxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, 
Shangdong, Henan and Shaanxi) of non-autonomous areas where Han 
people dominate; the third is the group of fifteen regions(Hebei, 
Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Zhejinag, Hubei, Hunan, Gangxi, Hainan, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai and Ningxia) of autonomous 
areas where minorities reside; and the fourth is that of three conflict 
regions of Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. Among the five leading 
cities, Gwangdong and Chungqing are autonomous regions, but as they 
are special areas the central government takes special emphasis on in 
terms of economic development, including these cities in the category 
of autonomous regions could result in bias. For the same reason, three 
major cities are also excluded in the group of non-autonomous regions. 
In light of this problem, these regions are managed in this study as a 
separate group- five leading cities.   
 
 
 15  
5. Constraints 
Firstly, this study has the limit of time scope of data.  
As mentioned earlier, the time scope of data in this study ranges from 
1996 to 2005. For more exact analysis, it would be desirable to collect 
all data from the foundation of China up to now. In this way, we could 
also compare the situation of the regions under a totally socialist 
system and after the adoption of an open market economy. However, 
with the actual difficulties in collecting reliable data by regions, most of 
them must be collected from the National Statistics of Bureau of China. 
It provides information only from 1995 to 2005. Therefore, inevitably, 
the time scope of data had to be limited for ten years. 
 
Secondly, this study has the limit of selecting research subjects in 
analyzing data.  
Among various subjects of data, this study deals with only a few data 
analyses. They are major items that can show the overall situation of 
unequal development. However, it can not be deniable that in some 
subjects there is possibility to endow somewhat different results. So I 
would like to confirm that the results of this study are confined only to 
presented data. And also I want to point out the fact that in some 
autonomous regions, according to the ratio of Han people’s immigrant 
population, the figure can be somewhat overestimated or 
underestimated. All figures are targeted on all residents in those 
regions.  
 
Thirdly, this study has the limit of researching and collecting the exact 
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and precise conflict situation of minorities.  
As well known, it is hard to collect rich data or articles regarding 
ethnic minorities’ conflicts thanks to the Chinese government’s 
inspection and sanctions. Only throughout some newspaper articles or 
research papers, their situation can be known to the people and no one 
can sure the exact number of riots or the frequency. There are some 
articles that present Hui, an Islamic ethnic group of China, as the 
possible conflict minority, but with the difficulties of knowing exact 
regions, background and the degree of conflict, this study has to 
exclude the case of Hui. My short knowledge of Chinese also makes 
constraints in collecting broad data of them.     
 
Ⅱ. Chinese Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism 
 
Before foundation of a country, it is well known that the economic 
situation of Chinese minority residency so fell behind. At that time, 
most ethnic minorities worked in the traditional primary industry; more 
seriously in Xingjian, they were still under the serfdom system, the 
primitive industry. Therefore, there was an inequality gap between 
areas where Han people resided and those where minorities did in 
terms of industry structure and level of economic situation. With the 
perception that this inferior economic situation could encourage the 
minority nationalism, Chinese Communist Party has done trials to 
reduce this gap after foundation. As a result, it is true that the economy 
of minorities has quite developed. However, as their situation was 
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originally so inferior, it looks comparatively improved, but in real terms 
most of them are still under the level of average.  
Recently, after adopting open economy and reformation, the rapid 
economic growth and development make China leap to a big country’s 
status in the international community. However, in a more critical 
perspective, it brings up very important questions. It means that the 
only one ideology, Socialism, which had tied all Chinese up would not 
have powerful influence upon the people anymore and as a substantial 
economic gap increases between regions and cities, movements of 
separatism or riots have strongly appeared. Comparing to the Eastern 
regions’ outstanding development, the development of South-western 
regions where most ethnic minorities reside is going with snail’s gallop. 
As the pace of industrialization is accelerated, the gap between them 
will be widened even more seriously than now. The problem is a 
possibility that this kind of situation could stimulate some minorities’ 
nationalism and separatism more; and, if there are not any changes of 
policy towards them, these movements will not disappear. Under this 
assumption, this study will, first, look into actual situation of minorities; 
and, next, tries to find clues if there are actual relations with 
occurrences of nationalism and unequal development. From analysis of 
data, we could find an answer to a step forward to solve the problem of 
Chinese minority nationalism and we should ask questions as to 
whether the policies of the Chinese Communist Party are going into the 
right direction, as well.  
To begin with, let’s look at the outline of Chinese ethnic minorities and 
their importance. 
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1. Outline of Chinese Ethnic Minorities and Their Significance 
China, which officially represents itself as a “Unified multi-national 
country” or “Multi-national socialist country,” has small and large sized 
55 ethnic minorities except Han people. According to the 5th population 
census, the ratio of the ethnic minorities is only 8.41%20  and Han 
people occupy more than 92% of the whole population. Therefore, in 
terms of population, the ethnic minorities are not given much more 
weight. However, in spite of the numerical inferiority, Chinese ethnic 
minorities can not be considered as a simple “minority.” In fact, the 
ratio of their population to the whole Chinese is low, but their total 
population is almost one hundred million and it is the number that 
exceeds the scope of any one country.  
They live spreading out mostly to the South and West of China. China’s 
communist government sets the special districts where large numbers 
of minorities reside as an autonomous area and adopts special policies 
for them. One of them is an immigration policy which encourages Han 
people to move to minority districts and weakens the density of 
minority. However, because the birth rate of minorities is quite high, 
the total ratio of minorities to the whole population does not seem to 
show a big change.   
 
[Table 1] Administrative Division and Population of Minority Nationality 
Autonomous Areas (1995/2005) 
                                            
20
 The ratio of minority peoples in population has increased. At the first population 
census in 1953, it was 5.89%, but in 1982, it became 6.62% and recently (2000) it 
increased up to 8.41%. The reason that the ratio of them has increased was the policy 
of curbing the increase of population had not been comparatively enforced. Moreover, 
it is because that some minority peoples, who had been stated as Han people, 
recovered their own nationality.       
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  1995 2005 
Provinces  
 
and 
Population Minority Minority Population Minority Minority 
Autonomous In Minority Population Population as  in Minority Population 
Population 
as  
Regions Areas   
Percentage 
to 
Areas   
Percentage 
to 
  (10 000   
Total 
Population 
(10 000   
Total 
Population 
   persons)   in Minority  persons)   in Minority 
      Areas(%)     Areas(%) 
National 
Total 
16068.4 7232.1 45 17507.10 8238.95 47.06 
Hebei 190 103.4 54.4 196.17 114.18 58.21 
Liaoning 335 152.8 45.6 334.64 170.10 50.83 
Jilin 321.9 118.2 36.7 330.71 114.06 34.49 
Heilongjian
g 
24.8 5.2 21 25.06 5.26 21.00 
Zhejiang 17.4 1.7 9.8 17.73 1.82 10.29 
Hubei 436.5 205.7 47.1 446.46 240.80 53.94 
Hunan 535.8 371.3 69.3 489.03 360.22 73.66 
Guangdong 44.3 14.6 33 47.68 17.95 37.64 
Guangxi 4502 1734 38.5 4925.00 1898.00 38.54 
Hainan 182.3 78.3 43 157.03 78.42 49.94 
Chongqing       252.69 170.05 67.29 
Sichuan 850.4 461.6 54.3 653.77 369.81 56.57 
Guizhou 1409.4 787.3 55.9 1588.62 945.79 59.54 
Yunnan 1990.2 1070.7 53.8 2124.94 1163.82 54.77 
Gansu 290.5 139.9 48.2 321.61 183.77 57.14 
Qinghai 291.5 168.6 57.8 327.01 201.92 61.75 
Ningxia 512.4 174.9 34.1 596.20 214.51 35.98 
Inner 
Mongolia 
2237.2 433.8 19.4 2386.40 515.76 21.61 
Tibet 235.6 228.8 97.1 276.00 258.00 93.48 
Xinjiang 1661.4 981.4 59.1 2010.35 1214.69 60.42 
Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1995 and 2005 
Note: The bolds are conflict regions.   
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In terms of territory, their residential areas are 612 ten thousand ㎢ 
and it means that they live occupying 63.7% of the whole land. In 
addition, the western areas where ethnic minorities live densely are the 
rich repository of natural resources, Hydropower and underground 
resources, such as coal, oil, gas and gold, as well as food resources. 
 
[Table 2]  Natural Resources in Minority Nationality Autonomous 
Areas 
Item 2004 Percentage to All country 
Total Area      (10 000 sq. km) 611.73 63.72 
Area of Grasslands in Pastoral 
and Semi-pastoral Areas     
(10 000 hectares) 
30000 75 
Area of Forest             
(10 000 hectares) 
5648 42.2 
Stock Volume of the Forest  
(100 million cu.m) 
42.49 51.8 
Hydropower Resources      
(100 million kw) 
4.46 66 
Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 2004 
 
Moreover, the western areas are important strategic points. Namely, 
among 21,000㎞ of border line of China, 19,000㎞ belong to the 
Minority autonomous regions and the majority of cities are theirs. 
Around their residential district, newly independent countries after 
Soviet Unions fell down, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
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and other 12 countries like Mongol, India and Vietnam are adjacent to 
33 ethnic minorities. More important points are among them; 20 
minorities have very similar nationality, customs, traditions, and 
religions to the right outside of borderline and they have contacted 
each other and sometimes shared the same history. Therefore, these 
countries might play an important role in overall situation of other 
ethnic minorities; and Chinese minority groups’ unstable situation or 
discontents can affect the foreign relations with adjacent countries.  
 
2. Nationalism of Chinese Ethnic Minorities – focusing on Inner 
Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang 
Among ethnic minorities, three of them are very famous for the severe 
movement of separatism; Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. In this 
section, we will briefly look into their nationalism and situation. 
 
(1) Inner Mongolia 
Inner Mongolia, the third largest region of China 21 , located in the 
northern area and its territory is almost one eighth of the whole 
country. Many minorities such as Mongolian, Hui, Mansu, Daur and 
Oraqen live together. It was designated as the first autonomous area on 
May 1, 1947 and that was before the time when Chinese Communists 
declared victory to the battle with Kuomintang. The reason Chinese 
Communists tried to establish the autonomous government of Inner 
Mongolia under the difficult situation was to prevent it from uniting with 
the Republic of Mongolia. The republic of Mongolia declared 
                                            
21
 The largest region of China is Xinjiang and the second is Tibet. 
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independence from China and established its own country in 1911 with 
an aid from Soviet Union. China did not admit its independence at first, 
but after deciding to accept the existence of the republic of Mongolia 
via people’s vote, Chinese Communists had to admit the independency 
of it. As there is such a precedent, Chinese Communists could not 
overlook the possibility that Inner Mongolia might try to join the 
republic of Mongolia and make a vast country. It means that not only 
China is deprived of their large territory but also the northern areas 
can be threatened. In case of Beijing, the capital of China, the distance 
from the border line is now 600 km, but if Inner Mongolia is separated, 
it will be shortened up to 300 km. In terms of national security, Inner 
Mongolia is highly significant and serves as a breakwater.  
Therefore, Chinese government makes every effort to suppress the 
occurrence of independence movement in this region. The Chinese 
practiced a policy of genocide during 60 years and took the precious 
lives of countless Mongolians. In a well-planned and measured manner, 
the Chinese massacred the Mongols who ranged from well-known 
patriots, prestigious intellectuals and wealthy families to literate 
herders. Between the winter of 1968 and the spring of 1969 alone, 
there were about 320,000 Mongols who were either killed or tortured 
to receive injuries (official Chinese statistics). Since the year 1911, one 
million Mongols had died in the hands of the Chinese without natural 
causes. There are not any clear symptoms or actions that Inner 
Mongolians want to integrate with the Republic of Mongolia, but still the 
nationalism of this region seems to be quite strong.  
As Inner Mongolia has the world’s largest reserve of rare earth and its 
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reserves of coal, iron, oil, natural gas and gold are largest in China, 
during the past 60 years the Chinese government literally robbed the 
region off of these natural resources and transferred them to heartland 
of China as well as exported them abroad. Starting from the 1990s, 
under the name of "opening up the West", the Chinese accelerated their 
process of ‘robbery’ and turned many areas of inner Mongolia into 
mines. This kind of exploitation incurs Mongolian’s wrath and 
dissatisfaction from discouraged economic situation is rising to the 
surface. 
The situation of Human rights violation is also serious. The ideological 
repression and oppression have always been more severe in Inner 
Mongolia than in the heartland of China. To control and suppress Inner 
Mongolia’s nationalism, Chinese government uses a more severe policy. 
The Mongols do not have the least freedom of expression and press. 
Mongolian authors and intellectuals, who wrote to expose national 
oppression and injustice, to express their dissatisfaction and 
disappointment, and to call for democracy, are subjected to political 
pressure, discrimination and intimidation. Their works are still banned 
and most of them are in prison.  
 
(2) Tibet 
 Tibet, famous for the nickname “a roof of the world”, is a plateau area 
where most of its land is located at the height of more than 4000m. 
This plateau occupies two thirds of the total autonomous area. Tibet is 
the most serious conflict region and the population of Han people is 
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also the lowest.22  The history of struggle started in 1950. Chinese 
Communists ignored the insistence of Dalai Lama, who asked for a 
separate independent country, and invaded this region, persisting in the 
idea that Tibet belongs to China. On October 19, 1950, People’s 
Liberation Army of China sent troops, and, using coercive measures, 
China succeeded in making a “seventeen-point agreement”23 with Dalai 
Lama. Of course, the agreement was made only to satisfy the Chinese 
Communist Party and it only affirmed China’s sovereignty over Tibet. 
Tibetan guerrilla resisted the policy of Chinese Communists; in 
response to their rebellion, Chinese government mapped out the plan of 
Dalai Lama’s confinement. Due to the realization of Tibetans in advance, 
this plan failed, but big demonstrations and riots of Tibetans to protest 
against the Chinese Communist Party occurred everywhere in Tibet. 
The Chinese government overwhelmed them with military forces and 
during the suppressive process lots of Tibetans were killed. Some 
Tibetans have accused the People's Republic of China of a campaign of 
terror after the invasion, which led to the disappearance of up to one 
million Tibetans. The Chinese government denies these claims, but 
charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, state terrorism and 
                                            
22
 In Tibet, the ratio of minority population is almost 94%. Comparing to other regions, 
this figure is so outstanding.    
23
 The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of 
Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, or the Seventeen Point 
Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet for short, is the document by which 
the delegates of the 14th Dalai Rama reached an agreement with the government of 
the newly-established People’s Republic of China on affirming Chinese sovereignty 
over Tibet. It was, under People’s Liberation Army’s military pressure, signed and 
sealed in Beijing on 23 May 1951 and confirmed by the government in Tibet few 
months later. When the Dalai Lama fled in 1959, he and the Government-in-exile 
repudiated the agreement. 
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torture are currently being investigated by a Spanish court.24  
After the 14th Dalai Lama and other government principals fled to exile 
in India in 1959, lots of protests and riots also had happened; and, as a 
result, between the 1960s and 1980s, many prisoners (over 1 million, 
according to Harry Wu25) were sent to laogai camps in Amdo (Qinghai). 
Since the 1980s, increasing economic liberalization and internal 
mobility has also resulted in the influx of many Han people into Tibet 
for work or settlement, though the actual number of this floating 
population remains disputed.  
Throughout some preferential policy of the Chinese government, the 
antipathy and discontents have somewhat weighted down, but Tibet is 
still named as a risky area that could trigger nationalism. Despite 
preferential policies or trials of guaranteeing their own customs and 
religion, Tibetan Nationalism does not extinguish. The existence of the 
government of Tibet in exile26 is also a big concern for the Chinese 
Communist Party. It blames that the economic plan and policy of China 
has done a good job only for the heartland, not for Tibetans and the 
Chinese government deprives Tibetans of innate right for its territory 
and resources.  
    
 
                                            
24
 http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article656410.ece  
25
 Harry Wu (born 1937; Chinese: Wu Hongda) is an activist for human rights in the 
People's Republic of China. Now a resident and citizen of the United States, Wu spent 
19 years in Chinese labor camps, for which he popularized the term laogai 
26
 The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), officially the Central Tibetan 
Administration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, is a government in exile headed by 
Tenzin Gyatso, the14th Dalai Lama, which claims to be the rightful and legitimate 
government of Tibet. It is commonly referred to as the Tibetan Government in Exile. 
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(3) Xinjiang 
Xinjiang, the largest region of China, is adjacent to many neighboring 
countries, such as the Republic of Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
India, etc. The total border line is 5,700 km and, in some of the areas, 
some dispute over territory with nearby countries still remains 
unsettled. The autonomous region was set on October 1, 1955 and nine 
ethnic groups are evenly spreading out to this region. At first, the ratio 
of Han people was low, but, due to the immigrant policy of China, the 
current percentage of Han People to Minorities is quite even.  
In Xinjiang, there have been inward conflicts between different 
minorities and outward conflicts between minorities and Chinese 
Communists. Moreover, in terms of military, there were conflicts 
between countries. From the end of 1950, the Soviet Union and 
Chinese Communists had placed troops centering on the borderline of 
this region; in 1962, when some people of Xinjiang flied to the Soviet 
Union, the relation between both countries was so strained. From that 
time on, there were some big and small military conflicts, but after the 
death of Mao Tsetung and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the national 
conflicts are under a brief period of tranquility; instead of them, inner 
conflicts come onto the surface.  
Since independent states were established in Central Asia, the Chinese 
government has tightened controls over Uighur in terms of expressions 
of ethnic identity in Xinjian.27 Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the 
United States, the Chinese government has equated peaceful 
                                            
27
 Human Right Watch, “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in 
Xinjiang”, Bovingdon ;“Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uighur 
Discontent”, Human Rights Watch, April 2005. 
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expressions of Uighur identity with "subversive terrorist plots." 28 
Xinjiang government has increased surveillance and arrests of Uighurs 
suspected of "harboring separatist sentiments" since popular 
movements ousted Soviet-era leaders in Ukraine, Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan.29  In May, 2005, the Xinjiang government intensified its 
"strike hard" campaign against activities it characterizes as ethnic 
separatism, religious extremism or international terrorism. 30  In 
September, 2005, Chinese authorities declared the "East Turkestan 
forces" the primary terrorist threat in China, and acknowledged that 
Xinjiang authorities have increased police surveillance and political 
controls throughout the region this year.31  
Recent government policies only exacerbate ethnic tensions in Xinjiang. 
The government's promotion of economic development in the region 
disproportionately benefits Han people. Together with restrictions on 
religious, linguistic and cultural freedoms, and government-supported, 
large-scale Han migration into the area have increased Uighur 
resentment and fears of coercive cultural assimilation32 and fears of 
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 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving 
the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism", Seeking Truth, No. 2, 2004, pp.2–4 
29
 Commission Staff’s Interview. "Press Conference on the 50th Anniversary of the 
Founding of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region", Tianshan Net (Online), 25 
August 05, Quoted in Congressional Executive Commission on China 2005 Annual 
Report ( http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt05/2005_3a_minorities)  
30
"In the Midst of Glory and Hope: Key Points in Propaganda for Xinjiang 50th 
Anniversary"[Xinjiang zai huihuan yu xiwang zhong fengyongqianjin: qingzhu Xinjiang 
weiwuer zizhiqu chengli 50 nianzhou xuanchuan jiaoyu yaodian], Xinjiang Daily, 
reprinted on Tianshan Net (Online), 19 May 05; "AFP: Xinjiang Ribao Carries 
'Editorial' Against Separatism as Uzbek President To Visit," Agence France-Presse, 
25 May 05 (FBIS, 25 May 05). 
31
 "Xinjiang Has Become the Main Battlefield For China's Antiterrorism Struggle," 
China Youth Daily, 6 September 05 (FBIS, 7 September 05). 
32
 Human Rights Watch, “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in 
Xinjiang”, Arienne M. Dwyer, “The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, 
and Political Discourse”, Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2005 
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deprivation. Although the extensive security apparatus in Xinjiang 
appears for the present to have crushed Uighur calls for greater 
autonomy, scholars report that "the majority of Uighurs does not like 
the system of autonomy and the course of politics." One Western 
scholar notes that "repression on this scale may temporarily succeed in 
subduing the expression of ethnic identity but in the long-term it can 
only increase the resentment that Uighurs feel and fuel deeper conflict 
in the future."33  
 
3. Factors causing Nationalism of Chinese Ethnic Minorities 
When finding factors causing these regional conflicts and nationalism, it 
might be natural to consider the background about each region’s 
different history, tradition, religion and life style. Normally scholars 
point out the propensity for selecting regional elites, the difference of 
religions, historical emotions and difference of nations as reasons.34 In 
China, it is a common view that the minority nationalism is a kind of 
regional conflict and it results from suppressed historical events and 
the differences of nationality or religion. Especially in case of Tibet, 
this insistence is quite reasonable. Officially speaking, Tibetans admire 
Dalai Lama as a rebirth Maitreya35 and regard him as a spiritual leader. 
China as a Socialist country prohibits this kind of powerful religious 
activity and thinks it as a kind of idol worship. The Chinese government 
worries Tibetans can provoke a separatist movement and bring Dalai 
                                            
33
 Michael Dillon, "Uighur Language and Culture Under Threat in Xinjiang 
34
 Park, Gwangduk, “Chinese regional conflicts and national unification centering on 
national conflicts”, The collected book of Korea East Asia Research, the fourth 
series(1997), p.133  
35
 Maitreya means the merciful Buddha.  
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Lama forward as their political leader. With some historical events for 
suppressing Dalai Lama and Tibetans intermingled, this prediction 
would be quite reasonable.  
However, only finding reasons causing minority nationalism on outward 
differences will have a certain limit. In Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, the 
difference of religion does not seem to have much weight on the issue 
of conflicts. Are those from the difference of nationality? Considering 
other regions, however, some minorities also have a different 
nationality and culture. Since the official foundation of China, it has 
passed more than 60 years. During this period, Chinese ethnic 
minorities have lived under the special system, Chinese socialism, and 
that would not make much difference from the similar nationality living 
in the bordering countries. Furthermore, after adopting open market 
economy, China developed quickly, and its high status and the pride as 
a member of China cannot be easily overlooked.  
In terms of historical background, it is true that these regions have an 
especially wounded memory, but no one can explain why other 
minorities, who do not share it within these regions, participate in riots 
and show emotional consent with the rise of nationalism. Political 
autonomy or propensity of elites in certain nation is not the best 
answer because it applies to all nations. Why are particular regions 
noticed as the origins causing separatism movements among many 
autonomous regions? The question starts from this. As a matter of fact, 
dissatisfaction of conflict regions would not be simply based on the 
anger over ignorance of their religions or collective memory. The other 
factor must affect their antagonistic feeling and trigger nationalism. 
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In this aspect, the other perspective pays attention to the unequal 
development and the feeling of isolation in the process of 
industrialization. Let’s look at Table 3.   
 
[Table 3]  Main Indicators of National Economic and Social 
Development by Eastern, Central, Western and Northeastern Region 
(2005) 
  
Eastern 
Region 
Central 
Region 
Western 
Region 
Northeastern 
Region 
Item  
As 
Percentage 
As 
Percentage 
As 
Percentage 
As 
Percentage 
  
National 
Total 
of National 
Total 
of National 
Total 
of National 
Total 
of National 
Total 
Natural Resources      
Area of Land   (10 000 
sq.km)                         
960.0 9.5 10.7 71.5 8.2 
Population      
Population at the Year-end 
(10 000 persons) 
130756 36 27.4 28.0 8.4 
Employment      
Employment At the Year-end 
(10 000 persons) 
75825 36 28.0 28.6 6.9 
Urban Area 27331 45 21.5 22.1 11.1 
National Accounting      
Gross Domestic Product  
(100 million yuan) 
183084.8 55.6 18.8 16.9 8.7 
Primary Industry 23070.4 37.7 27.0 25.8 9.5 
   Secondary Industry 87046.7 58.5 18.0 14.8 8.8 
   Industry 76912.9 59.8 17.5 13.9 8.8 
   Tertiary Industry 72967.7 57.2 17.5 17.0 8.3 
Investment in Fixed Assets      
Total Investment in Fixed 
Assets 
88773.6 52.4 18.5 20.3 8.8 
(100 million yuan)      
Real Estate Development 15909.2 60.8 14.0 16.8 8.4 
Government Finance      
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Local Government Revenue 
(100 million yuan) 
14884.2 60.2 15.2 16.6 8.1 
Local Government 
Expenditure (    //     ) 
25154.3 46.0 18.7 24.9 10.4 
Foreign Trade      
Total Value of Imports and 
Exports (100 million USD) 
14219.1 89.9 2.9 3.2 4.0 
    Exports 7619.5 89.2 3.2 3.4 4.2 
    Imports 6599.5 90.7 2.6 2.9 3.8 
Agriculture      
Output of Major Farm 
Products (10 000 tons) 
     
    Grain 48402.2 26.4 30.5 27.8 15.3 
    Cotton 571.4 32.5 30.9 36.6 0.1 
    Oil-bearing Crops 3077.1 29.5 40.7 24.9 4.9 
Industry      
Output of Major Industrial 
Products 
     
    Coal   (100 million tons)                           22.1 12.9 41.8 36.9 8.4 
    Crude Oil  (10 000 tons)                                  18135.3 37.1 3.2 24.8 34.9 
    Electricity  (100 million 
kwh)                          
25002.6 45.1 22.7 24.4 7.7 
    Crude Steel (10 000 tons)                               35324.0 55.2 21.2 12.9 10.7 
    Cement   (10 000 tons)                                     106884.8 51.6 22.5 20.6 5.3 
Transportation      
Expressways 41005 41 25.5 25.7 8.0 
Total Passenger-kilometer 
(100 million person-km) 
17466.7 40.1 28.1 23.5 8.3 
Total Freight Ton-kilomete 
(10 million ton-km) 
80258.1 67.4 13.3 12.1 7.2 
Post and Telecommunication 
Services 
     
Total Business Revenue(100 
million yuan) 
12028.5 54.2 17.5 19.6 8.7 
Domestic Trade      
Total Retail Sales of 
Consumer Goods 
 67176.6 54.4 19.4 17.0 9.2 
Education      
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Number of Institutions  (unit)                            1792 39.8 26.1 23.9 10.2 
New Student Enrollment  (10 
000 persons) 
504.5 41.3 27.3 21.6 9.8 
Student Enrollment (10 000 
persons)                   
1561.8 41.2 27.3 21.2 10.3 
Number of Graduates (10 000 
persons)             
306.8 42.2 26.3 20.8 10.7 
Health Care      
Number of Hospitals  (unit)                                  298997 33.0 22.8 33.4 10.7 
Hospitals and Health Centers 60397 27.8 25.7 37.9 8.6 
Medical Technical Personnel  
(10 000 persons) 
446.0 38.6 25.5 25.0 10.9 
Doctors 193.8 38.0 24.5 26.5 11.0 
Number of Hospital Beds (10 
000 beds)              
335.1 37.8 24.5 26.2 11.5 
Hospitals and Health Centers 313.5 37.6 24.7 26.4 11.4 
      
Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 2005 
 
It is a table that shows the main indicators of national economic and 
social development by Eastern, Central, Western and Northeastern 
Region in 2005. There are 40 indicators that can help to know the 
overall situation of each region. It will be natural that every country has 
a different gap among cities and regions, but as you notice, the 
situation of China is more serious and special. First of all, it is because 
the gap amongst regions is so outstanding and partial. Secondly, it is 
because the developed regions are identical to the areas where mostly 
Han people reside. Using the terms of Hechter, the distinction of core 
and periphery seems to be quite clear. Ethnic inequalities are shown 
alongside unequal regional development. With the development of 
telecommunication and transportation, minorities could know the rapid 
growth of eastern regions and this could make them have a feeling of 
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deprivation or isolation. Social safety net under the socialism has been 
demolished and life of minorities would be harder than before. Even 
though Han people live spreading out in the minorities’ autonomous 
regions, the percentage is very small and most disadvantages from this 
inequality are totally ascribed to the minorities. The more precise 
things regarding this fact will be discussed later.  
Consequently, from the data that shows unequal and partial 
development situation in China, the second perspective has a question 
and assumes that severe inequality is attributed to the resurgence of 
minority nationalism.  
 
Ⅲ. Situation of Unequal Development amongst Regions  
and within Conflict Region. 
 
In this section, based on assumption of the aforementioned second 
perspective, this study will find out evidences of the relation with 
minority nationalism and unequal development. To get more clear-cut 
image, fist of all, I compare various data which can measure the degree 
of development amongst regions. These data will be divided into 6 
categories: first, the differences of economic structure and GDP 
amongst regions; second, the differences of unemployment rate and 
total wage amongst regions; third, the differences of educational 
degree amongst regions; fourth, the differences of urban and rural 
development amongst regions; fifth, the differences of infrastructure 
amongst region; and sixth, the differences of social welfare system 
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amongst regions.  
Afterwards, this study will try to find out the situation of inequality 
between Han people and ethnic minorities within the conflict regions. 
Because of the difficulties in collecting raw data, this section depends 
on literature references. Rather having constraints, it will give us a tip 
to understand why ethnic minorities are not satisfied in spite of some 
preferential policies and a certain degree of development propelled by 
the Chinese central government.  
From these analyses, we can even estimate the possibility of “internal 
colonization.” 
 
1. Unequal Development Situation by Issues and by Regions 
I use six categorized issues to know unequal development situation by 
regions. I mentioned them right above.  
The time scope of data ranges mainly from 1996 to 2005. As a matter 
of fact, to obtain more exact result, it would be more suitable to set the 
time scope from the time that Deng Xiaoping started an open economy 
policy in 1978 up to now. However, there have been some changes in 
administration districts and that makes it more difficult to access each 
region’s data. Almost all data are from the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China (NBSC), so I set the time scope as wide as I could, according 
to the availability of securing raw data.    
The objects of data are 31 regions of China. It is based on the 
distraction division from NBSC. I divide them into four groups: the first 
is the group of five leading cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, 
Gwangdong and Chongqing; second come eight regions (Shanxi, Jiangsu, 
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Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shangdong, Henan and Shaanxi) of non-
autonomous areas where Han people dominate; the third is the group of 
fifteen regions(Hebei, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Zhejinag, Hubei, 
Hunan, Gangxi, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai and 
Ningxia) of autonomous areas where minorities reside; and the fourth is 
that of three conflict regions of Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. 
Among the five leading cities, Gwangdong and Chungqing are 
autonomous regions, but as they are special areas the central 
government takes special emphasis on in terms of economic 
development, including these cities in the category of autonomous 
regions could result in bias. For the same reason, three major cities are 
also excluded in the group of non-autonomous regions. In light of this 
problem, these regions are managed in this study as a separate group - 
five leading cities.  
  
(1) Differences of Economic Structure and GDP amongst Regions  
To know the overall economic structure of each region and growth, two 
data will be discussed. First is the data that could let us know the level 
of industrialization; second is the one that could show the degree of 
development. Let’s look at the [Figure 1] first.  
[Figure 1] is a graph that shows numbers of employed people at the 
year end by three industries and regions in 1996 and 2005. To get a 
more clear comparison, time series data is not used. 
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[Figure 1]Numbers of Employed Persons at the Year-
end by Three Industries and Region(1996 and 2005)
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1996 and 2005 
 
Overall, all regions have increased in Tertiary industry. Compared to 
the small increase of Secondary industry, it is quite an interesting 
result that Tertiary industry has developed more quickly. Especially, in 
conflict regions, the increase ratio is outstanding. The percentage has 
changed from 22.6% to 31.1%. This result seems to have been caused 
for reasons of rapid growth of tourism industry in Tibet and of poor 
investment in Secondary Industry. Generally Speaking, in the process 
of Industrialization the path toward a developed society is moving from 
the primary industry to the tertiary industry step by step. And, 
considering the stage of China’s development, the secondary industry 
must be the major growing sector. However, in both autonomous and 
conflict regions, there is a decrease in secondary industry. It means 
that they do not have any meaningful fundamental investment in this 
industry; thinking about the high percentage of primary industry, we 
can say that there is no change in industry structure. They still remain 
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at the pre-industrialization level. On the other side, 5 leading regions 
and non-autonomous regions seem to follow the right step toward 
industrialization. 
Next is a graph about GDP increase by regions.  
[Figure 2] GDP Increase by Regions(1996 and 2005)
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1996 and 2005 
 
[Figure 2] shows a GDP increase between 1996 and 2005. In 1996, as 
you can see easily in the graph, there was not much difference amongst 
regions. Among them, conflict regions occupied almost one fourth of 5 
leading regions, but the total difference was only 84600 million Yuan. In 
2005, however, the gap between them becomes surprisingly huge. The 
average GDP of 5 leading regions in 2005 becomes 903500 million 
Yuan and that of non-autonomous regions is 890800 million Yuan. They 
show a similarly rapid increase growth rate in GDP. In contrast, even 
though there is also an increase in both autonomous and conflict 
regions, the degree of them is small. The increased GDP amount of 
autonomous regions for 10 years is 420500 million Yuan and that of 
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conflict regions is only 196400 million Yuan. Within the minority 
regions, it also shows a substantial gap between autonomous regions 
and conflict regions.  Moreover, the gap between 5 leading regions and 
conflict regions is 616500 million Yuan, almost four times the GDP of 
conflict regions. That means that catching up the pace of 5 leading 
regions is almost impossible and that there should be a different 
economic policy by regions. Considering the abundant natural 
resources in these regions, it is estimated that these resources are not 
used for themselves, but used for “core” regions.  
 
(2)  Differences of Unemployment Rate and Total Wage among 
Regions 
Whereas we discuss macroscopic data of economy above, we will see 
microscopic data in this section. They are unemployment rate and total 
wage gap among regions.  
[Table 4] is about urban unemployed people and unemployment rate by 
region. If taking into consideration that China does not experience 
entire urbanization yet, the figure is quite high in overall regions.   
 
[Table 4] Urban Unemployed People and Unemployment Rate by 
Region 
Unemployment 
(10,000 Persons) 
Unemployment Rate 
(%) 
 
Region 
1990 2002 2003 2004 1990 2002 2003 2004 
Average 
Rate 
(1990-
2004) 
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5 Leading 
Regions 
9.2 20.1 20.2 19.7 1.7 3.5 3.4 3.3 2.9 
Non-autonomous 
Regions 
14.5 23.8 24.7 26.5 2.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.4 
Autonomous 
Regions 
10.3 23.6 24.5 25.2 2.9 4.1 4.2 4.3 3.9 
Conflict Regions 12.4 9.2 13.8 11.0 3.4 4.2 4.0 4.1 3.8 
Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1990-2004 
Note: In conflict regions, the figure of Tibet’s 1990 and 2003 is not included because 
there is no data.  
 
In case of 5 leading regions, there is a big sharp increase from 1990 to 
2004. It must be because there is a rapid inflow of people from other 
rural areas and industries that these regions can not properly absorb 
the laborers. In other regions, however, especially in conflict regions, 
the unemployment rate has been constantly high for fifteen years. 
Unemployment rate is used in sociology as an indicator that could show 
crime, social instability and dissatisfaction of the current situation. 
Considering this aspect, there is a possibility that in conflict regions 
there are groups of people who are malcontented with the current 
system and policy of the central government because in general terms 
people regard unemployment problem as the government’s policy 
failure.  
 
Next is about the total wage by regions.  
[Figure 3] shows an increase of total wage between 1996 and 2005 by 
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regions. All regions present a substantial increase during this period, 
but they also show different increase rates amongst regions and the 
gap is becoming huge. In case of 5 leading regions, the total increase of 
wage is 56900 million Yuan; that of non-autonomous regions is 44100 
million Yuan. On the contrary, the total increase of wage in autonomous 
regions is 24700 million Yuan and it is almost half in the figure of non-
autonomous regions.  
 
[Figure 3]The Total Wage by Regions
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1996 and 2005 
 
The increase in conflict regions is similar to the level of autonomous 
regions: It is 20900 million Yuan. But, in this figure, conflict regions 
show again the lowest increase, which means that among the same 
minority regions there is also inequality between conflict regions and 
non-conflict regions.    
 
(3)  Differences of Educational degree among Regions 
Education is a crucial factor responsible for future social development 
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and producing future leaders and highly-qualified workers. Therefore, 
in this section, we will discuss the data of high education student 36 
enrollment and educational structure of employees by regions. If a 
region has more students and employees educated in higher institutions 
more than other regions, it means that it has a potential growth engine 
for future development and can advance by a step forward towards the 
stage of mature industrialization.   
[Figure 4] The Number of Student Enrolled
         of High Education by Region
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1996 and 2005 
 
[Figure 4] is a graph showing the number of students enrolled in high 
education by region. Unlike common expectations, non-autonomous 
regions have a largest number of students of high education. In this 
sense, we can predict these areas have a full capacity to develop 
quickly in the near future. In case of autonomous regions, the degree of 
                                            
36
 In this study, high education students mean ones who are educated in over college 
or university education level. 
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increase is rather low, but it shows almost similar figures of 5 leading 
regions. The question is as to conflict regions. Comparatively, Inner 
Mongolia and Xinjiang show a better result in absolute figures that are 
over the average of some autonomous regions. If we consider that the 
populations of these regions are the second and third largest in 
minority regions, however, the ratio of higher education students to the 
whole population is absolutely low. In the raw data, Tibet has more 
miserable figures. The total increase in number of people with higher 
education during 10 years is only 700. It does not show an actual 
increase of high quality human resources.  
Let’s look at the [Figure 5] along with the same context.  
 
[Figure 5] Ratio of High Education Students
   per Population by Region
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1996 and 2005 
 
It shows the ratio of high education students per population by region 
for 10 years. The absolute ratio of students is higher in five leading 
regions in both 1995 and 2005, and you can see that the total increase 
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for 10 years is also highest in them. Even though in [Figure 4] non-
autonomous regions seem to have the largest number of students, after 
reflecting the total number of population, we could know actual 
investment and effort for higher education are given to the 5 leading 
regions. In autonomous regions, the overall increase is slightly lower 
than non-autonomous ones. Still in this figure, however, conflict 
regions show a disappointing result. It shows only a half, compared to 
other two regions and a fifth of five leading regions. In this pattern, 
conflict regions can be seriously deteriorated in educational level and 
cannot easily cultivate the competent young people, which are directly 
linked to the competitive power in near future. 
Next two graphs represent the figures about the composition of male 
and female employed people by educational level and by region in 1999. 
  
[Figure 6] Composition of Female Employed Persons
              by Educational Level and by Region(1999)
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1999 
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In terms of national total, most workers have attainments in scholarship 
at the level of primary school and junior secondary school. It shows 
that China still does not enter the society of higher education and it 
should focus more on investment of education for the future 
development. Fortunately, the 5 leading regions have relatively high 
figures of senior secondary education and college level, but other 
regions show poor results. An interesting thing is that in conflict 
regions the figure of college level is quite high. If remembering that 
increase rate of higher education and the total number of them are so 
low, this result is mysterious. I assume that there are some immigrant 
workers from other regions according to the policy of Chinese 
government. Compositions of illiterate and semi-literate people are 
higher in autonomous regions than in non-autonomous regions; in 
conflict regions the figure is almost up to 34%. More than one third of 
the employees cannot do complicated work nor read books.   
 
[Figure 7] Composition of Male Employed Persons
                  by Educational Level and by Region(1999)
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1999 
 
In case of male employees, the situation is almost the same. If we point 
different things, the composition of illiterate and semi-literate males is 
lower than females; in non-autonomous and autonomous region, the 
ratio of males in junior secondary school is higher than that of females. 
This figure shows that male workers are more educated than female 
ones. But, in this graph, the composition of illiterate people in conflict 
regions is also the highest. More than half of the workers are under or 
at the basic level of education. Without a powerful and drastic policy 
for bringing up qualified people, the way to develop these regions in 
step with other region’s growth will be far away.   
 
(4)  Differences of Urban and Rural Development among Regions 
In this section of the study we will see the difference of urban and rural 
development degree among regions. In China, the most serious 
inequality problem except for regional inequality is the urban-rural 
inequality relation. Even in Han people areas, the gap between urban 
and rural areas is huge and this causes social instability and conflicts 
within them. Moreover, the serious poverty in rural areas plays a 
critical role in hindering further development. Because, relatively 
speaking, residents in poor rural areas could not invest money in 
human resource development and medical care, this turns back as a 
vicious circle in overcoming poverty. By comparing the gap between 
urban and rural areas and the degree of poverty in rural by regions, 
therefore, we can predict the future development of each region and 
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estimate a sense of incongruity within the region.   
The first figure is about the comparison of total income (per household) 
of urban and rural area by regions. 
[Figure 8] Total Income of Urban and Rural areas
               by Regions (2005)
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 2005 
 
Except for the 5 leading regions, other regions are below the national 
average of total income of urban area. The gap between the 5 leading 
regions and the others is so substantial that we could know that even 
non-autonomous regions do not enjoy fruits of urbanization and 
advanced life. Conflict regions still stay in the lowest. In the 5 leading 
regions, however, the gap between urban and rural area is also the 
biggest.            
Interestingly the sense of social incongruity between rural and urban 
areas could be higher in advanced regions than in others. The gap in 
non-autonomous and autonomous regions is quite similar and the 
amount of total income of urban and rural areas also shows close 
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figures. In case of conflict regions, the difference between the other 
two regions is not so huge, but they are the lowest, still. The gap 
between urban and rural income is the second highest.   
[Figure 9] is a graph about per capita net income of rural households 
by region from 1990 to 2005. 
 
[Figure 9] Per Capita Net Income of Rural Households
               by Region (1990-2005)
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1990-2005 
 
In 1990, besides 5 leading regions, other three regions were under 
1000 Yuan and showed almost the same figures. The living standard in 
rural areas was not very different from each other. Since 1995, 
however, there has been a difference between them. The absolute 
amount of rural income has increased as time passed by and the gap 
has also increased according to the time sequence.   
There are two informative messages from this figure: firstly, in terms 
of rural income and development, the gap between non-autonomous 
regions and autonomous regions is not more impressive than the gap 
amongst the 5 leading regions and the others. At least, in case of rural 
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poverty problems, ethnic inequality would not be strongly affected. 
Secondly, regardless of minor gap, the order has not changed. 
Autonomous regions and conflicts regions are the third and fourth, 
respectively. In a sense that the gap has slowly increased, we should 
watch the same pattern of development degree. 
 
(5)  Differences of Infrastructure among Regions 
In order to know the basic degree of social development and the effort 
of the government in the infrastructure, the level of public facilities and 
city construction between regions will be discussed in this section,.  
 
[Table 5] Level of Public Facilities in Cities by Region (1996 and 2005) 
1996 2005  
 
 
 
Region 
Percentage of 
Population 
with Access 
to Tap Water 
(%) 
Percentage 
of 
Population 
with Access 
to Gas (%) 
 
Per capita 
Public 
Green Area 
(sq/m) 
Percentage 
of 
Population 
with Access 
to Tap 
Water 
(%) 
Percentage 
of 
Population 
with 
Access to 
Gas (%) 
Per 
capita 
Public 
Green 
Area 
(sq/m) 
National Total 94.89 73.21 5.29 91.09 82.08 7.89 
Five Leading 
Regions 
(1997) 
98.45 89.03 5.13 95.63 90.69 7.79 
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Non-
Autonomous  
Regions 
83.8 66.95 5.08 91.38 79.67 7.62 
Autonomous 
Regions 
94.68 65.22 5.20 87.57 74.22 7.29 
Conflict 
Regions 
94.46 72.82 13.29 86.49 70.42 4.86 
Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 1996, 1997 and 2005 
Note: Because of finding difficulty of data of five leading regions in 1996, it will use 
data of 1997. 
  
[Table 5] shows an interesting result. Even in the five leading regions, 
the percentage of population with access to tap water has somewhat 
decreased from 1997 to 2005. Autonomous regions also present some 
decrease in percentage of population with access to tap water; in 
conflict regions there is quite a big decrease in every section. Only the 
non-autonomous regions show an increase. We cannot know a clear 
reason for this. But, supposing that in the five leading regions, 
especially in Chongqing and Shanghai, it could be the increase of total 
population or rapid influx whereas the number and system of 
infrastructure are of old. If regarding other possible reasons, however, 
the decrease of conflict regions in every area is quite surprising. Even 
per capita public green area decreased rapidly from 13.29 in 1996 to 
4.86 in 2005. We cannot but think that there has been privatization of 
public green area or environmental destruction.  
When only looking at the figures in 2005, the gap between regions is 
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quite clear. In 1996, there is not any significant inequality between 
regions. In 2005, however, both in the leading 5 regions and conflict 
regions, the figure decreased gradually one by one. It seems that in the 
basic infrastructure inequality might be between the residency of Han 
people and that of minorities.      
Next, we will look into the overall city development situation by 
regions. [Table 6] is about the statistics on city construction in 2005.  
 
[Table 6] Statistics on City Construction by Region (2005) 
 
 
 
Region 
Developed 
Area 
(sq.km) 
Land Put in 
Requisition 
for State 
Constructio
n Project 
(sq.km) 
Population 
Density of 
Urban Area 
(persons/sq.
km) 
Total Floor 
Space of 
Buildings 
(year-end) 
(10,000 
sq/m) 
Total Floor 
of 
Residential 
Buildings 
(year-end) 
(10,000 
sq/m) 
National Total 32520.7 1263.5 870.2 1645064.1 1076899.6 
Five Leading 
Regions 
1350.3 47.5 1394.9 64817.9 40893.7 
Non-
Autonomous 
Regions 
1311.7 63.6 2119.4 66620.5 43021.1 
Autonomous 
Regions 
918.7 32.8 1403.7 48433.4 32668 
Conflict Regions 498.2 8.5 675.2 20503.5 12747.3 
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 2005 
 
As mentioned earlier, the territorial area of minorities is over 60%. 
However, the total developed area in all autonomous regions is only 
1407 sq. km and it is slightly over the figure of five leading regions. In 
the column of land put in requisition for state construction project, 
conflict regions show outstandingly low figures than any other areas. It 
is only one fourth of autonomous regions and one eighth of the five 
leading regions. Non-autonomous regions show the highest figure in 
population density of urban area than the 5 leading regions, so we 
could estimate that there will be much labor inflow into these areas; 
urban circumstance of those regions is inferior to that of the leading 
ones. In contrast, autonomous and conflict regions reveal the low 
density of urban population, but it also means that they did not start 
urbanization yet. In total floor space of building and residential building, 
minority regions show low figures whereas two regions have similar 
conditions. Conflict regions are averagely at the half level of other 
autonomous regions.   
 
(6)  Differences of Social Welfare System among Regions 
Finally, this study will cover the differences of social welfare system 
among regions. It will be divided into three categories: unemployment 
insurance, medical insurance and basic pension insurance. To avoid 
bias caused by the differences of total population, these data use the 
ratio to the total population.  
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[Figure 10] Beneficiary ratio of Umemployment Insurance
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 2005 
 
[Figure 10] shows the beneficiary ratio of unemployment insurance. 
Unexpectedly, the 5 leading regions present a lower percentage of the 
beneficiary ratio. Instead, non-autonomous regions show the highest 
ratio and autonomous regions are also above the national total average. 
Comparatively, these regions would be stable in economic depression 
or changes; possible social conflicts or crimes that result from 
unemployment could be low. But in case of the 5 leading regions, the 
ratio is quite low. Presumably there are some factors that lead to a low 
unemployment insurance ratio, such as rapid turn over of labor or 
massive influx of workers from other regions.   
In this case, as local government could not deal with unemployment 
within its financial scope, the beneficiary ratio can be low. However, in 
conflict regions, which do not have liberal inflow or outflow of laborers, 
it will be an inadequate explanation. Han people immigrate by the policy 
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of government, so most of them have the status of employment. If so, 
we can predict that the local governments of conflict regions do not 
give enough finance or do not have a proper policy for unemployed 
people. As you see the unemployment rate by region above, the 
unemployment rate has been high. In that sense, complaints about an 
incomplete policy or government inability can be provoked.  
Next is about the number of health institution and medical insurance. 
[Figure 11] is a simple comparison of the number of health institutions 
by region. If considering the total population of each region, the result 
of this data will be reasonable. The number of medical institutions in 
conflict regions is the lowest again, but it shows a similar figure of the 
5 leading regions. It means that the ratio of the number of institutions 
to the whole population could be higher than the 5 leading regions. 
 
[Figure 11] Health Institutions by Region
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 2005 
 
However, conflict regions have vast territory; so, if these institutions 
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are concentrated in certain areas, the accessibility to these medical 
institutions will be worse.  
Next figure is about the medical insurance by regions. In spite of the 
small number of medical institutions, the coverage ratio of medical 
insurance is the highest in the 5 leading regions. Conversely, non-
autonomous region and autonomous regions show the lower ratio in 
medical insurance. They are below the national total average. If there 
are outbreaks of striking diseases, these regions can be more 
vulnerable and people are hardly capable of coping with the high cost 
of medicine. Interestingly, conflict regions show a somewhat high 
percentage of medical insurance coverage. Local governments may 
have more interest in medical field than the other two regions do.  
 
[Figure 12] Coverage Ratio of Medical Insurance
                 per Total Population
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 2005 
 
Lastly, [Figure 13] is about the coverage ratio of pension insurance. 
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Source: National Statistics of Bureau of China (NSBC) 2005 
 
In pension insurance, three regions show similar figures. The coverage 
ratio of Non-autonomous regions and autonomous regions is about 12% 
and it is slightly lower than national total average ratio. 
In conflict regions, it does not reveal an absolute gap between the 
other two regions, but it also shows the lowest ratio in pension 
insurance. Prominently, the 5 leading regions show the highest ratio 
and it is over three times higher than that of conflict regions. Stability 
and the level of living in those regions will be surely different from 
others, and the anxiety or fear of uncertain future would be low.   
 
2. Unequal Development Situation within the Conflict Region 
In this section, we will discuss about the unequal development situation 
within each conflict region. It can be regarded as a more serious factor 
that makes ethnic minorities feel anger and grievance because it is life 
[Figure 13] Coverage Ratio of Pension Insurance 
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that they face everyday.  
To what extent, it is true that even conflict regions have been 
developing as you saw above. Comparing to other regions, the degree 
and speed of development are slower, however, it is undeniable fact 
that they are starting to get better and seem to reach on the similar 
level of other autonomous regions in some issues. Someone insists that 
with the help of “Western Development Project” driven by Chinese 
central government, the inequality amongst regions has been reduced, 
therefore, it would not be a determinant factor in arising nationalism. 
But another problem arises on the surface; internal inequality within 
each conflict region between Han people and minorities.    
White report of the government of Tibet in exile comments that the 
price Tibet paid for this development was higher than the gains.37 Year 
by year, the Chinese government claims great economic advancement 
in Tibet such as bumper crops, industrial growth, improvement of 
infrastructure and so forth. However, given China’s record in ethnic 
minorities, two things must be borne in mind when assessing social and 
economic developments: the first is that the Chinese government 
claims cannot be taken at face value. Even official statistics appear to 
be drawn up to prove a particular political point rather than to present 
an objective picture of the situation. Secondly, evidence shows that it is 
not the ethnic minorities who benefit from the economic development. 
The primary beneficiaries of China’s new open economic policy are the 
Chinese settlers in these regions, their government and military, and 
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their business enterprises.38  
As a method of suppressing nationalism in conflict regions and making 
them assimilate with Han Chinese, the Chinese government has 
encouraged immigration of young Han people to these regions. Some 
estimates indicate that 250,000 Han Chinese make the journey west 
each year.39 It achieves the desired end of the Chinese government in 
a sense. However, it also leads the result that minorities recognize 
their inequality situation. To make worse, according to quality of life 
indicators such as education, unemployment, life-expectancy, and 
poverty-rate, ethnic minorities lag far behind their Han Chinese 
counterparts. Recent central government initiatives economic 
disparities in the regions have actually highlighted and perpetuated the 
problem. Many of the large infrastructure construction projects initiated 
by the central government provide jobs for migrant workers (not local 
workers), and in spite of preferential policies for ethnic minorities,40 
jobs often go to Han workers rather than indigenous workers.41  
In the usage of natural resources, ethnic minorities seem to be 
marginalized and have little control over their own natural resource 
base. For instance, timber and mining industries in Tibet are areas that 
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not only receive large chunks of China’s “financial assistances,” but are 
also amongst the most important employers of Chinese immigrants in 
Tibet. The products of these industries are carted away to China. Even 
taking the case of road construction, the primary objective of 
construction in conflict regions is to deploy occupying forces along 
with defense materials, and immigration of Chinese, as well as to 
exploit the natural resources like forests and minerals, which are 
transported primarily to China.42  
Therefore, the Chinese pattern of development in conflict regions is 
considered to have intention of controlling the Ethnic minorities’ 
economy rather than stimulate initiative, enterprise and production. It 
works by creating a vicious circle in which local demand for goods is 
served by state-owned enterprises in China. Profits from these 
enterprises are then ploughed back as subsidies, serving to create 
conditions for the further extraction of natural resources needed by 
China’s own enterprises. In the light of experiences, ethnic minorities 
cannot but view the recent opening of Tibet’s economy to foreign 
investment as a move to accelerate the transfer of Chinese population 
and exploitation of their natural resources for the benefit of the colonial 
power. 
In the matter of social welfare, discrimination exists between Han 
people and minorities. For example, in case of Tibetan health service, it 
is not only urban-biases, but serves the rich people better than the 
poor. Only 10 percent of financial outlay for health goes to rural area; 
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90 percent goes to urban centers where Chinese settlers are 
concentrated and where most of the hospitals are located. Even when 
available, medical facilities are prohibitively expensive for the most of 
Tibetans. Moreover, as the previous free health care system was 
demolished, competent doctors do not need to do obligatory work in 
deteriorated regions. As a result, most of doctors in these areas are not 
capable ones, and what make worse, many of them are unqualified.43 
Consequently, the Chinese government claims that there are 3,700 
doctors and health personnel, but this official statistics in health care 
service can not be fully trusted. Ethnic minorities are comparatively 
exposed to the deteriorated circumstances, so the prevention and cure 
of diseases are an important issue in deciding the level of the standard 
of living. However, changed health care system and indifference of the 
central government make their lives harder than before.    
In terms of higher education, every year a certain number of university 
seats are officially reserved for ethnic minority students and their 
expenses form part of the budget for minority education. It is one of 
the preferential policies for ethnic minorities. However, most of these 
seats go to Chinese students. To go to university, the student must 
pass a competitive examination after graduating from upper-middle 
school. Since the examinations are conducted in Chinese, ethnic 
minority students are disadvantaged and lose places to Han Chinese 
students. The growing trend is that Chinese students who have failed 
entrance examination in their homeland go to autonomous regions to 
resit their examination. Because the general standard of education in 
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these regions is much lower than in China, these students fare well 
against minority ethnic students, and thus take places in universities.44 
In conflict regions, massive immigration of Han people propelled by the 
Chinese government makes worse this situation. Therefore, the real 
number of students in higher education in these regions can be much 
smaller than one of statistics.  
Consequently, although there are some preferential policies for ethnic 
minorities, the effects are questionable. Rather some of them served as 
momentum which makes ethnic minorities realize their harsh and 
unequal situation. A kind of internal colonization seems to be 
proceeding.       
    
3. Analysis of the Result 
From the results of data and literature references, this study indicates 
three points. 
Firstly, inequality development in China is proceeding alongside ethnic 
differences. 
Almost all data show that inequality has increased ranging from the five 
leading regions to conflict regions. Only except for some cases, such as 
unemployment insurance coverage ratio and the number of health 
institutions, the five leading regions always stay at the top and non-
autonomous regions follow suit. Granting that many of these regions 
are located in coastal area and it is of great help to develop them the 
gap amongst regions is so substantial and has been increasing. Merit of 
location cannot explain why other autonomous regions could not 
                                            
44
 Same paper, p.9 
 61  
develop in spite of abundant resources and Chinese government’s 
ambitious plan “Western Development Project”. The Chinese 
Communist Party has advertised that this project has promoted the 
standard of living in minority regions and pushed to speed up their 
economic growth rate. However, the data in this study reveals that it 
failed. Considering the absolute figure of each data without regional 
comparison, they seem to develop. But if considering the overall 
situation of other regions’ development, that of autonomous regions is 
improving at a snail’s pace and in some cases they are deteriorated 
more than before. In the meantime, the natural resources exploitation 
by central government has speeded up. For minorities in autonomous 
regions, the construction of some infrastructure, like train, paved road 
or gas pipeline, is viewed as an effective way for Han people to exploit 
the resources for the sake of their own development. As long as the 
investment or support of Western Development Project is not purely 
used for minorities’ development, this inequality development alongside 
ethnic differences will not be changed.  
 
Secondly, conflict regions experience much more inferior development 
than other autonomous regions do.  
Amongst the same autonomous regions, three conflict regions, Tibet, 
Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, show the greatest deterioration in every 
aspect. They are suffering from high unemployment, high rate of 
illiteracy, pre-industrialization structure, low level of social welfare 
system, etc. Some people can say that this kind of inferiority would 
have resulted from the severe nationalism in those regions, not from 
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the failure of policy or exploitation by the central government. 
However, nationalism of conflict regions was not so devastating enough 
to prevent overall economic and social development. Instead, we should 
pay attention to the fact that resurgence of minority nationalism falls 
into step with the unequal development recently.45  
 
Thirdly, there is also inequality and discrimination within each conflict 
region. They are mainly resulted from the immigration policy and 
“Western Development Project”, which mainly target on conflict 
regions. The primary goals are to assimilate ethnic minorities with Han 
Chinese and to develop these areas like eastern coastal areas. 
However, biased plans and policies forward Han Chinese breed 
discourse. The fruits of the economic development in these regions are 
mostly heading for Han Chinese and the feeling of deprivation get 
shown on the face. The moment the construction of massive 
infrastructure and foreign investment are not for them but for Han 
Chinese and the moment their bountiful natural resources are not used 
for their own development, ethnic minorities can realize that they are 
colonized. As the powerful social welfare system is collapsed and 
Socialism is not the powerful propaganda in China anymore, minorities 
find something to unite them; the strongest one will be nationalism. The 
frequent uprisings in Xinjiang and potential but ceaseless asks for 
independence in Tibet are not irrelevant to these inequality situation. 
The fact that conflict regions are under the most serious unequal 
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development lets us think of the relation between nationalism and 
inequality issue. If this assumption is right, minority nationalism will not 
disappear, so long as inequality is not alleviated. 
  
Ⅳ. Summary and Suggestion 
 
China has been the most rapidly growing economy in the world for over 
25 years. This growth has fueled a remarkable increase in per capita 
income and led to a decline in poverty rate from 64% at the beginning 
of the economic reform to 10% in 2004.46 At the same time, however, 
different kinds of disparities have increased. Inequality has risen, 
propelled by the rural-urban gap and the regional gap.  
In other aspects, there have been minority movements for entire 
sovereignty or separatism in China. At first, it started from repulsion of 
the oppressed process of consolidation by the Chinese Communist 
Party, but as time passes by, the aspect of the nationalism has changed. 
At the level of pre-industrialization, nation difference or inequality was 
not severe enough to regard them as suppressed class nation or 
“periphery”. They were tied up under the name of Socialism and 
government provided the basic needs, such as medical care, 
employment, education or pension. Even though the level was so basic 
and most Chinese had suffered from serious poverty, minorities 
themselves did not aware of repressed or exploited nations. However, 
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after declaring new Chinese way of Socialism and adopting an opening-
door policy, the gap amongst regions has sharply increased. As Ernest 
Gellner indicated, at the level of industrialization they become a nation 
class and a new way of relation between majority people and minority 
can be formed. Majority people try to exploit labor and resources of 
minorities. Hechter argued that it is “Internal Colonialism”. There can 
be the relation of core and periphery within a nation. According to his 
logic, minorities as periphery find it hard to get over inequality 
situation and escape from poverty because their human and natural 
resources are used for the development of core, Han Chinese. 
Of course, Hechter’s logic has constraints; some criticize that growing 
differences in income, education, employment and social welfare may 
be occurring, but it is important to note that such a growing disparity 
cannot be explained solely through the lens of ethnicity. The majority 
of both Han and non-Han are experiencing roughly the same uneven 
regional benefits of national economic development based on 
geographic residence and socio-economic background, not simply 
ethnicity.47  
However, as there are not profound researches about the disparity 
between Han and non-Han people within the same region, we could not 
jump to the conclusion that Hechter’s logic is absolutely wrong. There 
are some indications that Han immigrants are mostly well-educated and 
assigned to develop the deteriorated region by the central government. 
Moreover, Han people are somewhat advantaged to do business than 
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minorities because they use the standard language. These things can 
make the Han get more benefits or earn more money despite the 
coarse situation. As a matter of fact, many minorities do not welcome 
the immigration policy of the central government in these regions 
because Han Chinese take up the seats in universities as well as job 
opening market.  
Therefore, this study assumed that the Chinese unequal development 
can affect the rising of minority nationalism and tried to reveal its 
relation. The hypothesis will be like this: if inequality influences the 
occurrence of minority nationalism, conflict regions will be suffering 
from unequal development much more. If they have similar conditions 
to other autonomous minority regions, another factor will be strong. So, 
in this study, the research objects were categorized into four groups 
(five leading regions, non-autonomous regions, autonomous regions 
and conflict regions) and the data result which can estimate economic 
and social development was compared. In addition to that, we briefly 
look into the inequality situation within conflict regions. Whereas data 
analysis is for revealing the “broad and external inequality”, this is for 
revealing “internal inequality” and adding for compliment on data 
results.   
It concluded that, firstly, inequality development in China is proceeding 
alongside ethnic differences; secondly, conflict regions are much more 
inferior to any other region. Without an exception, conflict regions 
were ranked in the lowest and the gap amongst other regions was huge. 
As time passed by, the gap has been increasing. Consequently, it 
showed that Hechter’s theory is quite reasonable in China’s case. 
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Through the data analysis, we also deduced the fact that the inequality 
factor could be the causal factors of social incongruity and instability. 
Income gap, small amount of GDP, illiteracy, unemployment, urban-
rural gap and improper insurance system are the major contributors 
impending social integration, which is true everywhere. If the emotion 
of being deprived is added and they realize that losers have a 
distinguished nationality, the individual anger or dissatisfaction can link 
to collective discontents or nationalism.  
In order to integrate various peoples under the single banner of a 
country, therefore, the inequality development policy should be 
reconsidered. Conflict regions’ unequal development does not simply 
mean “lagging behind.” Without solving the problems of minority 
inequality and nationalism, the simple “choice and concentration” policy 
could cause great disadvantages in the near future.  
Lastly, with some recommendations for the minority development 
policy, I will conclude this study. Facing the 17th National People's 
Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC), the Chinese Communist Party 
will decide the policy for next four years. Three ways are rumored to 
be discussed. Left wing people will insist that a more tightly planned 
economy only can save China from its current problems and solve the 
minority nationalism while right wing people are insisting on the 
necessity of democratization. And the rest is arguing in favor of a 
middle way between them. Right now, the Chinese seem to consider 
which way will be best for solving critical problems in China: 
Democratization or a more tightly planned economy? However, from 
the minority’s standpoint, both seem to have limits. Democracy is 
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basically the logic of majority. It will be desirable for the future of 
China, but, for minorities, another inequality policy might have been 
started. Moreover, because there are not many educated people in 
minorities and more than one ethnic group are living together within a 
region, establishment of an entirely autonomous government means 
that they must go through lots of trials and errors in the long run. A 
more tightly planned economy will worsen the situation. It is another 
expression of a more strict policy of inequality.  
Therefore, rather than following the linear direction of the Chinese 
Communist Party, a precise and prudent approach to the minority 
inequality problem will be needed. To further this discussion, I would 
like to introduce some possible new models for ethnic Minorities’ future 
which are mentioned by Gladney. 48 
First is the Alaska Model. Residents of ethnic minority direct dividends 
for returns on wealth derived from regional natural resources, in 
accord with Article Two of the International Covenant on Economics, 
Social, and Cultural Rights. By according benefits to all 2nd or 3rd 
generation residents of these conflict regions, China can perhaps 
obviate inter-ethnic tensions in the region and deflect criticisms that 
recent non-local migrants “lured to the region” by a government 
interested in integration through immigration are the real beneficiaries 
of China’s increased investment of the region.  
Second model is the Scotland one. Although it is clear that China would 
never consider granting full independence to the region, an approach 
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that grants the region more control over its own resources an 
governance, while maintaining central control over national defense and 
international trade would not only seem to make sense in the modern 
era, but parallels traditional models of Chinese imperial control of the 
regions under the last dynasty. 
Finally, there is the Hawaii’s model. China must find a way to allow its 
local peoples to legally, democratically and officially express their 
concerns about the development process in the region, the future 
directions of tourism and trade, and the prospects for greater autonomy 
and sovereignty. State and Federal funding for elected representatives 
of indigenous peoples, which have real input into the legislative process, 
such as the elected office of Hawaiian Affairs attempts to accomplish. 
We cannot sure which one will be suitable for current China now. To 
get the right solution for ethnic minority problem, more painstaking 
concerns and endeavored researches will be needed. Anyhow, the most 
important thing will be that they should be utilized to promote the 
quality of living and activate the local economy. By giving an 
impression that the central government worries about the minority’s 
living standards and authentic developments, lost faith between them 
should be rebuilt.  
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